Gender Equality and Fertility: Which Equality Matters?

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Abstract:

Does gender equality matter for fertility? Demographic findings to this question are rather inconclusive. We argue that gender equality is a complex issue that needs to be conceptualized in a way which includes gender equity and allows for gender differences but uncovers gender inequalities.

We explore this approach by investigating the impact of four dimensions of gender equality on women’s and men’s childbearing intentions in Europe: the possibility to maintain a household, the capabilities to choose, the resources to have agency, and gender equity in household work and in care. We apply logistic regressions to data of the Generations and Gender Survey. Our results suggest that gender equality and fertility intentions are intertwined in a multi-faceted way, and that gender equality in the areas which we examine exert different impacts on women’s and men’s childbearing intentions. Our study also confirms that parenthood still constitutes a dividing line between more and less gender equality, and that this affects childbearing intentions of childless women and childless men differently than that of mothers and fathers. This necessitates an approach which allows identifying the essential gender inequalities in employment, in society, and in the family which matter for childbearing decisions.

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The political interest in demographic change: Gender equality and fertility policies

Since the end of the twentieth century, demographic issues have received increasing attention in the European Union. Documents issued by the European Commission have addressed low and declining birth rates in European member states\(^1\) and have viewed low fertility as a major challenge to Europe’s future development. In line with most EU member states, the Commission stresses the need for policies to raise fertility and it regards an increase in birth rates through appropriate policy interventions as realistic (European Commission 2007; European Commission 2010a and 2010b). It proposes a wide range of policies to improve the possibilities for women and men to found a family, including financial support, the flexibilization of working hours and work organization, and the policies which facilitate sharing family and domestic responsibility (European Commission 2007). Since the authority to pass policies that directly affect childbearing behavior lies mainly with the member states, the EU links its suggestions to its employment and its gender mainstreaming agendas as specified in the Lisbon strategy, the Barcelona targets, and the gender equality roadmap (European Commission 2007; 2010a; 2010b; 2010c). Their strategies focus on the reconciliation of work and family life to increase female labor-force participation rates to 75% by 2020 and to strengthen women’s economic independence, not least for women with parenting responsibilities (European Commission 2010a). The European Commission maintains that equal economic independence through higher female employment and through measures to facilitate work-life balance will have a positive impact on fertility (European Commission 2010a, 4). To reach this goal the EU urges its member states to expand their childcare provisions (European Council 2002, 12), to set incentives to expand flexible working arrangements, and to pass measures to encourage men to take up family responsibilities (Commission of the European Communities 2006b; 2010a).

\(^1\) For cases in point, see the Green Paper on demographic change and the new solidarity between the generations (Commission of the European Communities 2005), the Commission’s communication on the demographic future of Europe (Commission of the European Communities 2006a) and the Commission’s first report on Europe’s demographic future (European Commission 2007).
Placing fertility issues within these gender-equality objectives of the EU has major implications for fertility-related policy approaches and for fertility research. It calls for a broadening of the perspectives of the policy-fertility nexus in order to encompass gender equality. This implies that we should examine the relationship between employment, working arrangements, financial resources, care, family work and fertility from the perspective of gender equality.

We take this as a starting point to explore the impact of gender equality in these areas on childbearing intentions of women and men in Europe. We make use of the first wave of the national Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS) of ten Eastern and Western European countries, namely Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Romania, Russia, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway. The GGS was specifically designed to facilitate research on the relationship between gender aspects and fertility. Unlike many other surveys, the GGS treats both women and men as agents of reproduction in their own right. This allows us to study the impact of gender equality on fertility intentions of women and of men alike. Moreover, previous investigations have mostly focused on Western Europe; we also include some countries in Eastern Europe. This expands our possibilities to assess the general impact of gender equality on fertility. While researchers often assume that societies progress from less to more gender equality, there have been considerable setbacks in gender equality in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the state-socialist regimes (Funk and Moghadam 1994; Gal and Kligman 2000a and 2000b). The transformation has affected both women and men, and gender relationships have been restructured in many ways. This should caution against the assumption that the relationship between gender equality and fertility follows a one-directional line of development, and that it can be explored by grounding one’s fertility research on simple one-dimensional measures of gender equality.

We rather need to acknowledge that gender equality is a complex issue. Theoretically, it can comprise several elements, for example, equality of opportunity, equality of outcome, gender differences without inequality or inequality despite the lack of differences. Empirically, it concerns several dimensions, both at the societal and at the private (familial) level. The various elements and dimensions of gender equality may
have different impacts on childbearing intentions and they may work differently for childless women and childless men, for mothers and fathers. This requires that we conceptualize gender equality in a way that grasps the complexity inherent in the concept of gender equality. Drawing on the gender-equity approach proposed by Fraser (1994) and McDonald (2000a; 2000b) and on feminist research we outline an approach to capture specific dimensions of gender equality and we investigate which impact these dimensions have on women’s and men’s childbearing intentions at different parities.

Our paper proceeds as follows: We first give an overview of recent studies of the relationship between gender equality in employment, financial resources, and family work on the one hand and fertility on the other hand. We proceed with a theoretical reflection on the measurement of gender equality in fertility studies, followed by a suggestion to reconceptualize gender equality in a way that it captures the gender-equality-relevant meaning of employment, care, financial resources, and family work. We then present the results of our analysis based on an application of these concepts, focusing on the childbearing intentions of childless women and men, and of mothers and fathers with different parities. We conclude with some reflections on the implications of our findings for research and for policy strategies.

Gender equality and fertility: Does equality matter?

A number of studies related to Western Europe point to the importance of gender issues for fertility development, but whether gender equality increases fertility is contested (Westoff and Higgins 2009; Goldscheider, Oláh and Puur 2010; Mills 2010). Empirical macro-level studies show that the negative association between female labor-force participation and fertility has weakened over time or has even changed to a positive association (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Ahn and Mira 2002; Castles 2003; Engelhardt, Kögel and Prskawetz 2004; Kögel 2004 and 2006). These observed changes in the macro-level relationship between employment and fertility are largely attributed to institutional changes, in particular to the extension of childcare facilities and to the de-familialization and de-feminization of care (Esping-Andersen 2009; Castles 2003; Neyer
2003 and 2005). In countries which support such changes, as for example the Nordic countries, researchers often find a positive or at least not a negative impact of women’s employment on childbearing, while the effects are mostly the reverse in countries that adhere to “motherism”, that is, countries whose policies endorse women as sole carers (Kravdal 1994; Andersson 2000; González, Jurado and Naldini 2000; Vikat 2004). These findings are substantiated by the results of a study on the fertility effect of social expenditures for different family-policy programs (Kalwij 2010). This study shows that family policies which mitigate the tension between employment and childcare for women generate positive fertility outcomes (Kalwij 2010).

A meta-analysis of micro-level studies does not corroborate the macro-level findings of a change in the relationship between female labor-force participation and fertility (Matysiak and Vignoli 2008). The results rather show that while there is a continuing negative association between women’s employment and childbearing in most countries, there is variation as to the strength of this negative association (for similar findings on the macro-level see Kögel 2004 and 2006). It is strongest in countries that support motherism and male-breadwinner families, and it is weakest in post-communist countries (Matysiak and Vignoli 2008). The latter countries once actively promoted gender equality in labor-force participation, but did not aim at altering the gender division of unpaid family work (Matysiak and Vignoli 2010).

The study by Matysak and Vignoli (2008) furthermore reveals that the negative association between women’s employment and childbearing tends to be stronger for mothers than for childless women. This may be a consequence of the tension between employment and care. It may also result from the fact that the decline in women’s labor-force participation after childbirth makes women more vulnerable in the labor market and reduces their bargaining power in the home. Research shows that parenthood in general increases the gender gap in employment and family work. Women tend to reduce their employment after the birth of the first child, while men tend to increase it (Sanchez and Thomson 1997; Mencarini and Tanturri 2004; Misra, Budig and Moller 2007). The reduction in women’s employment also leads to a decrease in women’s financial resources (Misra, Budig and Boeckmann 2011). Research finds that tight economic
resources may have varying effects on women’s fertility. It may lead to lower or to later childbearing for women of some socio-economic groups, but may have no effect on the childbearing behavior of others (Aassve, Billari and Spéder 2006; Kohler and Kohler 2002; Kreyenfeld 2005).

On the level of the family, most research finds that greater equality in the gender division of care and of household tasks seems to be conducive to childbearing. However, the effect tends to depend on the amount of work or care taken on by the partner resp. the child’s father. A truly gender-equal division of childrearing responsibilities or a shift of the bulk of it to the partner/father may not necessarily encourage further childbearing (Oláh 2003; Duvander and Andersson 2006; Esping-Andersen, Güell and Brodmann 2007; Brodmann, Esping-Andersen and Güell 2007; Duvander, Lapegård and Andersson 2010; Lappegård 2010). Just as with the changing relationship between employment and fertility, the positive impact of a father’s involvement in childcare and household work is mediated by institutional circumstances. Policies supporting a dual earner-dual carer family model through public childcare and through workplace policies which give parents extensive rights in organizing their working hours according to care needs create an environment which is conducive to men’s/fathers’ engagement in family work (Hook 2006 and 2010; Cooke 2010; Korpi 2000; Sainsbury 1996). This in turn contributes to higher childbearing intensities among couples with actively caring fathers. If policies do not challenge the prevalence of the male-breadwinner/female-carer family organization or do not adjust working conditions towards gender-equal care requirements, the findings are less clear cut. They range from no effects or even negative effects of gender equality on women’s fertility to some positive effect among specific socio-economic groups or to a u-shaped effect with higher childbearing risks among women who enjoy a high degree of gender equality in family work and with lower childbearing risks among women who face a low degree of gender equality in such work (Cooke 2004; Esping-Andersen, Güell, and Brodmann 2007; Mills et al 2008; Torr and Short 2004; Craig and Siminski 2010). Most studies also find that father’s engagement in childcare is more relevant for further childbearing than father’s engagement in household
work. This calls for a cautious interpretation of the findings, since it could be that more child prone fathers engage more in childrearing.

The studies which we have reviewed draw a rather puzzling picture of the relationship between gender equality and fertility: While some research provides evidence that greater gender equality in employment, care, household work, and economic resources influences fertility and childbearing positively, other research finds that gender equality in these areas does not affect childbearing risks or even depresses further childbearing. The outcomes are mediated by institutional factors as well as by factors at the individual level, so that neither an overall positive nor an overall negative association between gender equality and fertility can be generally and unconditionally confirmed.

**Conceptualizing gender equality in employment, financial resources, and family work**

The lack of research results which assert a uniform effect of gender equality in employment, financial resources, care, and household work on childbearing challenges the assumption that there is a linear and uniform relationship between gender equality and fertility, in that less gender equality would imply less childbearing and more gender equality would lead to more childbearing. The studies furthermore dispute the common understanding of gender equality which implicitly or explicitly underlies many empirical studies, namely an understanding of gender equality as “sameness of distribution”. The variability of gender equality across these areas rather calls into question that the relationship between gender equality and fertility can be adequately measured if gender equality is conceived as sameness of distribution only.

Fraser (1994) proposes to replace the uni-dimensional, sameness-based concept of gender equality by the concept of gender equity, that is, by a conception of gender equality which stresses fairness and social justice and thus captures the complexity of gender equality over a simple measurement of sameness. Gender equity as a baseline concept for gender equality thus challenges research which uses an equal distribution as the principle measurement of gender balance. It provides a framework for a more
nuanced analysis of the links between gender relationships and fertility. McDonald (2000a; 2000b) applies Fraser’s concept to fertility research. He argues that in advanced Western societies cleavages in gender equity between individual-oriented social institutions (such as education or employment) and family-oriented institutions (such as familial childcare) lead to lower fertility. Yet, putting the emphasis on gender equity also implies that gender differences and even gender inequalities perceived as fair and just may not necessarily hamper childbearing and lower fertility. This may make it difficult to distinguish between the fertility effects of gender equality and the fertility effects of gender inequality perceived as fair and just.

McDonald (2000b) also pointed out that the possibilities to directly investigate the effects of gender equity on childbearing in quantitative research are limited, because questions on the perception of fairness and justice, particularly with respect to individual-level institutions (such as employment) are rarely included in demographic questionnaires. Moreover, such questions would only grasp the individual perception of fairness but would not provide a basis for measuring gender equality across countries with different gender regimes. For, the individual perception of gender equity in a society may be mediated by the specificities of gender equality in this society. For example, in all countries one can observe gender differences in employment, such as different occupational distributions of women and men. Yet, in some countries, where, say, access to employment is gendered, such differences may be perceived as fair and just, while in others, for example, in countries with a more gender-equal access to the labor market, they may be regarded as manifestations of gender inequality.

We therefore need conceptions of gender equality which overcome the limitations of a pure measure of sameness, but which also go beyond the confines of the concept of gender equity. Such conceptions should allow for gender differences, but identify gender inequalities. They moreover should include an understanding of gender equity, that is, they should capture fairness and justice from the perspective of both, women and men. We suggest four dimensions of gender equality which apply to women and men across different societies and which may thus serve as basic principles to capture gender equality in employment, financial resources, care, and family work: “forming and
maintaining a household”, “having capabilities to choose”, “having agency”, “having fairness in the gender distribution of family work and care”.

To form and maintain a household and a family
Despite gender differences, in all European societies, employment provides the main source of economic independence; it ensures one’s own and one’s family’s livelihood and it usually grants welfare protection over the life course. In most countries, this can only be achieved through full-time employment or through employment which secures an income on the level of full-time employment. Having full-time employment may thus be regarded as a proxy for a person’s capacity to “form and maintain an autonomous household” (Orloff 1993, 319), to assure her independent social protection, and to maintain her bargaining power in a partnership. This usually distinguishes full-time employment from part-time work. Working part-time mostly implies less income, lower social-security benefits, a reduced capacity to sustain a household, and in couples with an unequal amount of paid work, a reduced bargaining power. For childless women and for men in general, working part-time may also be a sign of tenuous labor-market integration and may be accompanied by greater risks of unemployment.

Capabilities to choose
Beyond the aspects of full- or part-time contracts, employment conditions may have several other features relevant for gender equality and thus for fertility behavior. One such feature may be the duration of the work contract (permanent vs. time limited), which grants or reduces future economic security. Another feature may be the possibility to arrange flexible working hours if family needs, such as the care of children, request it. Rather than viewing them merely as components of employment, we may regard them as capabilities to choose (Sen 1992), as features which enhance choices regarding family formation and family work vis-à-vis employment, and as features which provide the possibility to achieve well-being (Sen 1992). As Hobson and Fahlén (2009) point out, capabilities to choose may be essential in shaping the work-family balance, in making it possible for carers (women) to work and for workers (men) to be carers. They thus ease
or hamper the possibility of both, women and men, to have and to care for children equally.

In addition to working conditions, the availability of childcare or the assistance with childcare is also often regarded as an essential element of capabilities (Hobson and Fahlén 2009). As research has shown (see above), the availability of childcare adds to the capabilities of women and men to have children. Relief from childcare through institutional or private help may not only be seen as enhancing women’s capabilities to choose between work and family, but such help may also be seen as a substitute for the male carer, enabling both women and men to devote time to other activities, and reducing the tensions around the gender division of family work.

**Agency**

Similarly, the financial resources available to a person are usually seen as an indicator of her/his material standard of living. From a gender perspective, however, they can also be regarded as an indicator of a person’s *agency*, that is, of the scope of alternatives available to her (Korpi 2000, 132; Sen 1992; Lister 1997). Just as time related elements of work contracts are not alone a sign of specific work conditions, financial resources are not simply a sign of possessions, of poverty or of wealth. They are an indicator of the power to act, of the capacity to participate in the active life of society, of the possibility to reduce (unpaid) household work (Heisig 2011), and of the potential to decide one’s own life course, including the decision to have children.

**Fairness in the gender distribution of family work and care**

As for family work, the studies we reviewed indicate that *gender equity*, that is, the *perception of fairness in the division of household work and familial care* seems to dominate over the equal distribution of the tasks. Whether the gender distribution of family work is conceived as fair may differ between women and men, since the gains and losses of family engagement may also be distributed unequally between women and men. Moreover, the gender division of household task and care may be the outcome of a joint decision in a couple in which case one would expect each partner to regard the division as
fair even if it is unequal. Focusing on both, that is, on the impact of the distribution of family work and on the impact of the perception of fairness of the distribution on childbearing, may capture some of the complexity of gender equality at the family level and of its impact on childbearing.

**Which dimensions of gender equality matter for fertility intentions: Findings from the Generations and Gender Surveys**

We have outlined above dimensions of gender equality which allow the existence of gender differences and which comprise the notion of gender equity, but which are also able to capture gender inequality: to have the possibility to form and maintain a household, to have capabilities to choose, to have the resources for agency, and to experience gender equity in the gender distribution of work and care. These dimensions focus on the gender-relevant meaning of employment, work conditions, financial resources, and the division of household work and familial care. They thus allow us to overcome the limitations of purely distributional sameness-based measures of gender equality in our explorations of childbearing intentions.

In order to study the impact of these dimensions of gender equality on childbearing intentions, we make use of data from the first waves of ten national Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS).\(^2\) Intentions may be regarded as a suitable predictor of actual behavior (Westoff and Ryder 1977), provided the conditions at the time of interview persist (see Vikat et al 2007 and UNECE/PAU 2008a and UNECE/PAU 2008b). As we have mentioned already, we use the first wave of the GGS of Bulgaria, France, Germany, Georgia, Norway, Romania, and Russia, as well as the Hungarian Survey “Turning Point of the Life Course, the Italian Multipurpose Household Survey on “Family and Social Subjects”, and the “Netherlands Kinship Panel Study”. The latter three surveys incorporate large parts of the GGS and are part of the Generations and Gender Programme. With the exception of the Italian data, all national

\(^2\) For more information on the Generations and Gender Programme see: Vikat et al 2007; UNECE/PAU 2008a; UNECE/PAU 2008b, as well as the homepage of UNECE/PAU at [http://www.unece.org/pau/ggp/Welcome.html](http://www.unece.org/pau/ggp/Welcome.html) and the homepage of the EU-project “GGP Design Studies for Research Infrastructure” at [http://www.ggp-i.org](http://www.ggp-i.org).
datasets were harmonized and made available by the project “GGP-Design Studies for Research Infrastructure” funded through the 7th Framework Programme (FP7) of the EU (Grant 212749); the data for Italy were provided by ISTAT (the Italian National Institute of Statistics). The fieldwork of the first wave of the GGS was carried out in the various countries between 2001 (Hungary) and 2007/2008 (Norway), with most fieldwork taking place in 2004/2005. All GGSs comprise women and men aged 18 to 79. For our study on childbearing intentions, we limit the sample to non-pregnant women aged 18 to 42 and to men aged 18 to 49 at the time of the interview. We chose these age ranges because the decision to have a child beyond these ages may be less influenced by economic, private, and gender-equality considerations than the decision to have a child at a socially accepted childbearing age. Moreover, our GGS-data contained very few women and men beyond these ages who intended to have a child. Since we are interested in the impact of gender equality, we furthermore limit our sample to women and men who live in a partnership.

Our investigation focuses on women’s and men’s intention to have a child within the next three years (as reported at the interview date). By limiting the question about childbearing intention to a foreseeable time period we overcome some of the problems associated with the surveying of intentions. Answers to questions about an individual’s fertility intention in general, such as “how many children do you intend to (ever) have”, are likely to capture a social norm, that is the number of children individuals think they should have rather than what they will have. Such general questions therefore tend to lead to answers which confound intentions and social norms. Questions on intentions that cover an overseeable time period and that therefore are “in close temporal proximity to the prospective behavior” (Ajzen and Fishbein 1973, 49) are generally considered to be the better predictors of actual behavior. They offer the possibility to draw inferences from a person’s current status about which economic, institutional, and familial conditions are crucial in her/his decision process to have a(nother) child.

We study women’s and men’s childbearing intentions to have a child within the next three years separately, because motherhood and fatherhood have different consequences for women than for men. Economic and institutional aspects as well as the

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3 Billari et al. (2011) find that in Europe the socially accepted age norm for having a child is about 47 years
gender division of household and care work may therefore impact the childbearing intentions of women and of men differently. We also analyze the intentions to have a first child, a second child, or more children separately, because issues of gender equality in employment, institutional support, and the division of private work may play out differently for each parity. As mentioned, for women the birth of the first child, more so than the birth of subsequent children, often marks a critical juncture for gender equality in employment and family work. The decision to have three and more children often means going beyond the widely acknowledged norm of two children and may therefore be motivated by other economic, social, and gender aspects than the decision to have a second child.

We use logistic regressions with the intention to have or not to have a(nother) child within the next three years as the dependent outcome,\(^4\) and we estimate the impact of employment, work conditions, financial resources, the division and the satisfaction of care and of household work on women’s and men’s intention to have a first, second or third and subsequent child separately. We control for the respondent’s age, her/his marital status, her/his educational attainment, and the country she/he lives in. The respondent’s age is coded as below age 30 or above age 30 (up to the specified maximal age for women and for men). Following the ISCED classification of educational levels we grouped the respondent’s educational attainment into the three standard levels: basic education, secondary and upper secondary education, and post-secondary and tertiary education. The respondent’s union status differentiates between cohabiting and married couples. We also include the partner’s employment status, coded as employed or not employed\(^5\), and in models for parents the age of the youngest child, coded as below age 3 or age 3 and above. In all analyses of childbearing intentions of parents with two or more children, we also control for the number of children these parents have. For the present analysis, we pooled the data for all countries. We also ran interactions between the

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\(^4\) The standard GGS-questionnaire offers the respondent four answering options to the question whether she/he intends to have a child in the next three years: definitely yes, probably yes, probably no, definitely no. However, Norway only offered respondents the choice between yes and no. Since we wanted to have Norway in our study to maintain a balance between Western and Eastern European countries, we recoded all answers to yes or no respectively.

\(^5\) In some of the GGS countries one did not ask whether the partner is full-time or part-time employed.
countries and our main covariates to see whether there exist country-specific patterns of the relationship between the selected indicators of gender equality and fertility intentions, but to avoid overloading the paper and distracting from the main lines of argumentation, we will not report these results here.\(^6\) The dataset for our study comprised 2,992 childless women, 5,731 mothers with one child, and 9,927 mothers with two or more children, as well as 3,030 childless men, 5,430 fathers with one child, and 10,171 fathers with two or more children.

**Country Differences**

As expected, childless women and childless men in Eastern European countries are much more inclined to have a child within the next three years than childless women and men in Western Europe (with the partial exception of Italy) (see Table 1). The higher intention rates in Eastern European countries correspond to the universal childbearing in these countries; almost all women and men in these countries become parents and they still do so at a comparatively young age (Kesseli 2007; Rieck 2008; Frejka et al 2008). The particularly high childbearing intentions of childless women and men in Georgia are attributable to the very close connection between partnership formation and childbearing in this country (Badurashvili et al. 2008).\(^7\)

This clear East-West difference vanishes for mothers and for fathers of one child, and also for mothers with two or more children. Compared to their counterparts in France, mothers and fathers in Eastern and Western Europe show much lower intentions to have another child in the near future. This may partly reflect the tendency towards small families (of maximally two children) in these countries, and the tendency towards more children in France. Even if our results only reflect the intentions to have a child in the next three years, they may also indicate that in most European countries, and in

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\(^6\) The results of the interactions are available from the authors upon request.

\(^7\) The close connection can also be seen from the fact that almost all childless women without a partner interviewed in the GGS reported that they would like to have a child within the next three years. The answers were similar for childless men, but there were somewhat more men who stated that they do not intend to have a child in the near future. According to Badurashvili et al. (2008), in Georgia, partnership formation and childbearing are so closely connected that childless women’s (and men’s) intention to have a child within the next three years reflects in fact their wish to form a partnership (and family) in the near future.
particular in Eastern Europe, a child is still something most women and men are inclined to have, while continued childbearing seems to be more contested.⁸

[Table 1]

**Employment: The possibility to form and maintain a household**

As pointed out, we use employment as an indicator of whether a person can afford to form and maintain a household independently of the support of a partner or of others, and we differentiate between full-time, part-time, and no employment to assess to what extent she/he is able to form and maintain a household or family of her/his own.

Our results show that for childless women and men being in employment is important for considering parenthood in the near future. Childless women and childless men who are in full-time employment are much more prone to intend to have a child than women or men who are in part-time work or who are not employed. Full-time employed childless women and men are about twice as likely as non-employed women and men to intend to have a child in the next three years. Although part-time employed women and men without a child are much less inclined than their full-time employed counterparts to intend to have a child in the next three years, they still display considerably higher intentions to become parents than the non-employed do. This also holds if we include the partner’s activity status in our analysis. (Table 2).

The rather gender-equal pattern as to the importance of one’s own employment for childless women’s and men’s intention to become parents in the near future turns noticeably unequal if women and men have already one child. Mothers who have one child and who work full-time are less inclined to consider having a second child in the next three years than mothers who are not gainfully employed. Even mothers who work part-time seem to hesitate somewhat more to consider a second child soon in the near future than non-employed mothers do (although the results for part-time working mothers

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⁸ Since we only look at the intentions to have a child within the next three years, the results do not reflect the intentions of persons who would like to have a child in the more distant future (i.e.: four years or more
are small and not significant). But if the mother’s partner is in employment, her intentions to have another child are noticeably (about 30%) higher than if the partner is not in employment.

This contrasts markedly with the childbearing intentions of fathers who have one child: Fathers who are employed, and in particular fathers who are full-time employed, are more prone to consider having a second child in the next three years than fathers who are not employed, while their partner’s employment has no decisive bearing on their intentions to have a second child in the near future.

There is also a gendered pattern of childbearing intentions among parents who have two or more children, but it does not correspond entirely to the one of one-child parents. For women who have two or more children, own employment still inhibits further childbearing intentions, and having an employed partner increases them. For fathers of two or more children neither their own employment status nor that of their partner matter for their childbearing intentions. It is particularly part-time employment which makes mothers of two or more children refrain from the intention to have another child in the next three years, while the childbearing intentions of full-time employed mothers with two or more children do not differ from those of unemployed mothers. Since part-time work is more frequent than full-time work among mothers of two or more children, we may generalize that being employed reduces the childbearing intentions of mothers with two or more children considerably.

If, as suggested, full-time employment may be regarded as an indicator of the possibility to form and maintain one’s own household and to retain one’s bargaining power vis-à-vis a partner, then the results confirm that being able to support themselves (and their child) has become an essential aspect for women, and it has remained an important factor for men in their consideration to become a parent in the near future. By contrast, parenthood clearly exerts a gendering effect on women’s and men’s intentions to have another child in the near future: While her employment suppresses her intentions of further childbearing, his employment is still positively related to his intentions to have a child. And while his employment increases her intention to have another child in the

as of the time of the interview). This time factor needs to be kept in mind (even if we do not always point it
next three years, her employment seems to dampen or at least not to increase his intention to consider another child in the near future.

[Table 2]

**Work contracts and work flexibility: capabilities to choose**

We have argued that the type of work contract and the possibility to arrange regular flexible working time for personal reasons, like for adapting to children’s schedule, are proxies for women’s and men’s capabilities to “have and to care for [their] family” (Hobson and Fahlén 2009, 219) and to reconcile employment and childrearing. Surprisingly, as regards childless women neither the type of contract nor the potential flexibility of their work arrangements seem to matter for their childbearing intentions. There are only non-significant differences in their intentions to become mothers whether they have a permanent contract or a temporary one, are self-employed, and/or can arrange their working times or not (Table 3). Clearly, being employed overrules these employment characteristics in childless women’s considerations regarding childbearing within the next three years.

The importance of employment (vs. non-employment) also holds for childless men, but the type of contract and the options of work flexibility seem to matter for their childbearing intentions. Childless men who have some leeway in arranging flexible working times if necessary are somewhat more inclined to consider fatherhood within the next three years than men who have inflexible working arrangements or men who are self-employed. Contrary to one’s expectation, childless men who have a temporary contract show higher intentions to have a child in the near future than fathers with a permanent contract do.

When we turn to mothers’ and fathers’ intentions to have another child in the next three years, the picture changes, reflecting the gendered implications which parenthood has for women and for men. Compared to non-employed mothers, those with a
permanent contract and thus with greater employment security tend to be less inclined to consider having another child in the near future, while women with a temporary contract are clearly more favorable towards another birth (than non-employed, permanently employed and self-employed mothers are). This holds in particular for the childbearing intentions of mothers of one child, but applies potentially also to women with higher parities.

For fathers of one child, being employed still seems to support their intention to have another child in the next three years. Compared to fathers without employment only self-employed fathers show significantly higher intentions to have a second child in the next three years, while for employed fathers the type of contract and flexible working arrangements do not exert a decisive influence on their further childbearing intentions. The differences in childbearing intentions between the self-employed and the employed vanish among fathers of two or more children, with the exception of fathers who have a temporary contract. (Table 3).

Viewed from the perspective of gendered agency and women’s and men’s capabilities to combine work and care, these findings raise some questions. First, the fact that more flexible working arrangements increase childless men’s intentions to become a father may signal changing attitudes towards fathering among men. It could, however, also be that those who want to have children seek working conditions which may potentially allow them to devote some time to their family. To complicate the interpretation, it may also be that those who have the possibility to adjust their working times to familial needs have generally better working arrangements and working conditions than those who do not have such possibilities, and that their better working situation in total is conducive to childbearing inclinations. It should be noted that the higher fertility intentions among men who have flexible working hours only holds for childless men; it vanishes for fathers. However, we do find that self-employed one-child fathers, who may be assumed to have the possibility to arrange their working time flexibly according to their personal needs, do have higher childbearing intentions than one-child fathers who are dependent on their employers’ consent.
Second, the finding that mothers who have a permanent contract or are self-employed tend to refrain from further childbearing intentions while those who have temporary contracts tend to consider another child in the next three years point to persistence and changes in the relationship between motherhood and work. Motherhood still seems to affect women’s employment in a way that it lowers the childbearing intentions of those who are established in the labor market (measured via permanent contract) and of those who work for themselves. This suggests that these mothers do not want to endanger their employment or income situation through further childbearing.\(^9\)

The differences in childbearing intentions between one-child mothers and one-child fathers who are self-employed highlight the gendered implications of parenthood and work. It seems that, on the one hand, motherhood narrows women’s agency with respect to their employment and that, on the other hand, long-term employment prospects or the need to finance oneself narrows women’s agency with respect to childbearing intentions.

The higher childbearing intentions of mothers, in particular of mothers of one child, who have temporary contracts (compared to mothers who are not employed or who have permanent work contracts resp. are self-employed) also indicate a shift in the linkage between motherhood and employment. For, their higher childbearing intentions contradict one’s assumption that temporary contracts pose higher risks of becoming unemployed and losing one’s financial resources, and would therefore lower childbearing intentions. We may regard temporary contracts as contracts with less to lose in case of termination (compared to permanent contracts). Temporary contracts may also be an indication of a recent labor-market entry. If so, this may be a consequence of these mothers’ previous childbearing, which in many countries leads to (voluntary or involuntary) interruptions of employment and/or to changes of employers. If we view the higher childbearing intentions of mothers with temporary contracts from this perspective, then they indicate that – as for childless women – the possibility to maintain their income security is a pre-requisite for further childbearing intentions. Similar issues may apply to

\(^9\) Endogeneity may also play a role here: It may be that women with a permanent contract have a longer working career, which may imply that they planned to have fewer children than those with temporary contracts. It may also be that they have already reached the number of children they intended to have, giving them more possibilities to establish themselves in the labor market. The reverse may apply in case of other types of work contracts.
childless men and explain the higher childbearing intentions of childless men with temporary work contracts. Since in many countries parental-leave benefits are tied to previous employment, the higher childbearing intentions of mothers with temporary contracts may also signal that mothers who intend to have another child aim to have some income and social security of their own after potential further childbirth.

The gender differences in childbearing intentions which we find for women and men with different working contracts suggests that they are the outcome of gendered labor-market structures, gendered labor-market opportunities, and gendered employment histories, which not least may be brought about by the gendered employment (and care) consequences of childbearing. This leads us to propose that we need to view concepts like employment, permanent contracts, temporary contracts, work flexibility, but also capabilities and agency as inherently gendered. They may have a different meaning for women and men and may have different implications for their fertility decisions.10

| [Table 3] |

**Financial situation: agency possibilities**

We regard the financial situation of women and men as an indicator of women’s and men’s agency (Korpi 2000), of their possibilities to participate in social life, to engage in activities which they value (Sen 1992), one of which may be having children. To test the impact of the financial situation on the intentions to have a(nother) child in the next three years, we use the answers to the question whether it is difficult for the respondent to make ends meet (Table 4). As one might expect, those who state that they have difficulties making ends meet are less inclined to consider having a child in the next three years than those who do not face severe economic difficulties. The results for women and men show that it is particularly men, the childless as well as those with one child, who refrain from further childbearing in the near future, if they judge their financial situation

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10 Having the option of flexible working times arrangement may mean greater personal freedom in arranging one’s working life (something which often comes with better positions in the labor market and may therefore be found more often among male occupations). Flexible working time arrangements may also mean that the job has varying working hours, which may be negotiated to a certain extent under certain conditions.
as precarious. We take this as an indication that men still consider themselves as the main breadwinners and/or that the financial security of the family depends more heavily on them, so that the burden of economic difficulties wears more on their childbearing intentions than a similar economic situation does on women’s.

[Table 4]

Division of household and care work: gender equity in family work

Men’s participation in household and care work is recognized as an important factor shaping fertility behavior and fertility outcome. For our study of whether the gender division of household work and childrearing between the partners affects their childbearing intentions, we constructed an index of men’s contribution to household chores such as preparing meals, doing the dishes, shopping for food, doing the vacuum cleaning, doing small repairs around the house, and the like. We constructed a similar index of men’s involvement in childrearing tasks such as dressing the children, putting them to bed, playing with them, overseeing their homework or staying at home with them when they are sick. The measure for the division of household work and for childcare tasks ranges from no involvement (0) to much involvement (1) in family work. To control for the potential consent of both partners to the current division of household work and of childrearing tasks among them, we also consider in our analysis whether the respondent is satisfied with the division of household work or childcare tasks between her/himself and her/his partner. Even though being satisfied with the division of work may not correspond to a respondent’s perception whether the division of work is fair and just, we regard satisfaction as a proxy for gender equity, assuming that a respondent would not be satisfied with the division of work if she/he perceived the division of tasks as truly unjust and unfair.

As Table 5 reveals couples with a more balanced division of household work between the partners and couples who are satisfied with the division of household work between themselves are more inclined to have a child within the next three years than circumstances. This is customary in the service sector, where mostly women work. Research has shown
those whose household chores are mostly done by the woman alone and those who are dissatisfied with the division of household work among them. Although this result concerns women and men in all family forms, the division of household tasks is particularly relevant for the childbearing intentions of mothers of one child. They intend to have another child considerably more often if their partner engages in household tasks and if they are satisfied with the division of household tasks between themselves and their partner than if this is not the case. This finding is confirmed by the results of the effect of an interaction between the gender balance in household work and the satisfaction with it on women’s childbearing intentions (results not shown here). The differences between childless women and mothers of one child in the role which the division of household tasks plays for their childbearing intentions suggest that for women the gender balance in household work becomes particularly important once a child is born, which usually increases the amount of household work notably. For fathers, it seems to be less the division of household work which matters for their childbearing intentions, but rather whether they are satisfied with the arrangement between themselves and their partner. Satisfaction with the division of household work clearly increases fathers’ intentions to have another child in the next three years.

A comparison between the impact on childbearing intentions of the division of household work on the one hand and of childrearing tasks on the other hand reveals that they may affect short-term childbearing intentions differently. A more balanced division of work regarding the care of children encourages further childbearing intentions, except for fathers of two or more children, for whom the division of childcare between them and their partner does not matter for their childbearing intentions (Table 6). However, if we also control for the respondent’s satisfaction with the current gender distribution of childrearing tasks, the pattern becomes more diverse: For mothers of one child, the division of childcare between herself and her partner loses significance, while the satisfaction with the division of childcare strongly influences her further childbearing intentions. For mothers of two or more children, the actual sharing of care obligations between her and her partner overrules her satisfaction with the gender balance in care, as that these time-varying work arrangements are not conducive to childrearing (Neyer 1998).
far as her childbearing intentions are concerned. By contrast, if we control for the level of satisfaction, the childbearing intentions of a one-child father who engages in childrearing increase substantially. He is also more likely to consider a second child if he is satisfied with the division of care work between himself and his partner. There is no such effect for fathers who have two or more children.

These findings complement research results on the positive impact of a gender balance in the sharing of parental leave on subsequent childbearing (Duvander, Lappegård and Andersson 2010). However, the impact of a greater gender balance in family work on childbearing intentions varies by the work to be done, between women and men, by the number of children they have, and by her/his satisfaction with the division of work. It is surprising that once we control for satisfaction greater gender equality in sharing household work among childless couples does not significantly affect their intentions to have a child in the next three years. We would have expected to find a more pronounced response to a balanced division of household work among the childless, since a gender-equal sharing of household work while childless may be regarded as a sign of the partner’s (mostly men’s) willingness to bear some of the burden of daily family work. For women, the division of household work and the assessment of it only become prevalent for childbearing intentions once they have a child. This indicates that having a child puts additional burden on women, and it is under these conditions that the contribution by the partner and the satisfaction with the gender division of household work matter for their intentions to have another child in the next three years.

After childbirth, it is usually women who reduce their employment and in turn do more or most of the household work. It is from this perspective that we need to view the higher childbearing intentions of fathers who are satisfied with the division of household work and childcare between them and their partner. The presence of children in the household relieves men of active contributions to household work; this may increase their satisfaction with the division of household work, which in turn increases their childbearing intentions. We interpret these higher childbearing intentions as a consequence of the “secondary gain” which fathers have from a gendered division of household work in such families.
We find further support for this assumption when we look at the impact which third-party help in childrearing has on mothers’ and fathers’ childbearing intentions (results not shown here). Among all mothers and fathers, only fathers of one child below age three, who stated that their household does not receive any childcare help from others or only help from relatives and friends, are significantly more inclined to consider a child in the next three years.\textsuperscript{11}

The different influence which the division of household work and the division of childcare work have on the childbearing intentions of women and men seem to indicate that there are different expectations regarding the partner’s engagement in family work. With the increasing number of children, childbearing intentions of women seem to be more affected by the support which they get from their partner in childrearing, while the satisfaction with the division of childrearing seems to be less important for further childbearing. For fathers (of one child) taking care of their child and being satisfied with the division of childcare tasks between themselves and their partner exerts a positive impact on their childbearing intentions in the near future. Whether caring more for their child lets a father consider having a second child, or whether a father who wants to have more children engages more in childrearing than a father who does not want to have more children, cannot be disentangled with our data (for a discussion see Duvander and Andersson 2006). We can, however, conclude from our comparison of the influence which household work and childcare work and the satisfaction with either of them have on childbearing intentions, that a more balanced division of family work may contribute to enhancing childbearing intentions, although the results are not always significant nor always of a similar magnitude. The results also show that household work and childcare seem to be two different issues for men, and that they cannot be lumped together when investigating their effects on childbearing. The gendered shifts in the results when we add satisfaction to our model furthermore indicate that men’s engagement in household work

\textsuperscript{11} Contrary to our expectations we did not find any significant effects of the use of institutional care (for children below age three) on childbearing intentions. We attribute this to the fact that in most countries which we study institutional care for children of this age group are not very developed and are mostly used by children of working mothers. As discussed, mothers’ employment hampers further childbearing. Receiving help with childcare from relatives and friends also does not matter with regard to further childbearing intentions, except for its effect on one-child fathers’ intentions to have a second child.
and their engagement in childcare work may mean something different for men themselves than for women, with differing consequences as to gender equity and different impacts on further childbearing intentions.

[Table 5 and Table 6]

Conclusion – Which equality matters for fertility intentions?

We have taken the recent suggestions by the EU that national governments should implement policies to raise fertility as a starting point to explore the relationship between gender equality and fertility. We have concentrated on aspects of gender equality that correspond to the EU-strategies to raise female employment, to make work hours and work organization more flexible, to offer financial support to families, and to promote a more equal gender division of family work. The paper thus addresses a contentious question which has become prominent in the demographic as well as in the policy discourse regarding low-fertility countries: Does gender equality raise fertility? (Oláh 2011; Philipov 2011; Toulemon 2011; Neyer 2011). While the potentially fertility-enhancing effect of gender equality has become a frequent argument in suggestions regarding social and labor-market policies at the EU-level and at the level of EU-member states, demographic findings as to the effect of gender equality on fertility have been rather inconclusive. We argue that research and policy assumptions are often simplistically based on a uniform and uni-directional understanding of gender equality and its progress, based on “sameness of distribution”. We maintain that in order to capture the complexity of gender equality one needs concepts which allow for gender differences but expose gender inequality. Such an approach incorporates the notion of gender equity suggested by Fraser (1994) and McDonald (2000a and 2000b), and connects it to recent debates on “which equalities matter” for gender-equality policies (Phillips 1999; 2004; 2006). We have applied this approach to assess the impact of four dimensions of gender equality on childbearing intentions: the capacity to form and
maintain a household (range of employment), the capabilities to opt for care (flexibility of work), the resources for agency (financial resources), and gender equity in family work (gender division of household work and of care and the satisfaction with it).

In a nutshell, we find that the capacity to maintain a household through one’s own employment is essential for childless women’s and men’s intentions to have a child in the next three years. Once they have become parents, the positive effect of employment on childbearing intentions turns negative for women, while it remains positive for men. The possibility to arrange working times flexibly if family needs require it supports (childless) men’s childbearing intentions, but not necessarily women’s. Difficulties to make ends meet lower men’s childbearing intentions, but do not have an equally significant effect on women’s childbearing intentions. A more gender balanced division of household work tends to support childbearing intentions of women and of men, but men’s engagement in household work matters particularly for mothers of one child, while for men their satisfaction with the division of household work matters more than the actual sharing. Men’s involvement in and satisfaction with childcare also supports women’s and men’s further childbearing intentions, but the more children a mother has, the more the actual relief from childcare matters for her childbearing intentions in the near future.

How do these findings relate to our approach? And how does our approach, that is, assessing the impact of gender equality on fertility from a gender-equality perspective which includes gender differences but reveals gender inequalities, contribute to our understanding of the relationship between gender equality and fertility? Without evaluating the impact of employment on childbearing intentions from the perspective of “having the capacity to maintain one’s household and family”, we could have regarded the shift in employed women’s childbearing intentions after a first child simply as a matter of gender differences, for example, as differences in preferences between women and men or as a matter of individual choice. Viewed from the perspective of “maintaining one’s own household”, our results challenge such an interpretation by questioning that these preferences or choices are based on equal opportunities. The results rather prompt the question why mothers still seem to be confronted with having to choose between either maintaining their employment (and thus their capacity to maintain their household)
or opting for another child, while fathers do not. Within the gender-equity framework proposed by Fraser (1994) and by McDonald (2000a; 200b), such a “choice” is neither fair nor just. Within a framework which furthermore aims at eliciting gender inequalities, these results lead us to look for the factors and circumstances which produce inequality in choices, preferences, and in the results – in our case – in childbearing intentions. This draws the attention from individual-level gender differences, such as preferences or choices, to gender issues in the labor market and in society, and thus to contextual – and politically changeable – aspects of gender inequality.

Similarly, using “capabilities to choose” as the baseline for interpreting the results of the effects of workplace characteristics on childbearing intentions broadens the range of assessments to also include constraints and opportunities provided by the work sphere, by the state, or by other institutions. What does it mean that the possibility to arrange working hours for family reasons matters for childbearing intentions of childless men but not of childless women, while full-time employment does have a significant and positive effect on childless women’s childbearing intentions? From the perspective of “capabilities to choose”, this points to gendered capabilities: For men, it is the possibility to opt out of work or rearrange working hours if family needs request it, which enhances their childbearing intentions; for women, it is the possibility to opt into work that has such an effect. In other words, gender inequality with regard to the fertility impact of employment and working conditions manifests itself in that for men, it is the working conditions which (also) affect their childbearing intentions, while for women it is their access to and continuation of work which matters for their childbearing intentions.

As regards agency, our results reveal the gendered impact of economic insecurity on childbearing intentions. We can interpret women’s and men’s lowered intentions of have a child in the next three years if they have difficulties to make ends meet, as an expression of “agency poverty” (Korpi 2000), that is, as a limitation of their agency which also affects their childbearing intentions. It is noteworthy that childless men and one-child fathers are significantly less inclined to have a child in the next three years if they face economic difficulties, while there are no significant effects for women. We interpret this as a consequence of the persistent pressure on men to maintain the family.
This is underlined by the fact that, once parents, the employment status of the partner matters for women’s further childbearing intentions, but not for men’s. From the perspective of gender inequality, this suggests layered gender agency inequality. For, the pressure on men to be the breadwinners may result from women’s difficulties to maintain their employment after they have become mothers. The latter is expressed in the lower childbearing intentions of employed mothers as compared to non-employed mothers, and in the higher childbearing intentions of employed fathers as compared to non-employed fathers.

Turning to the influence of gender equality in household work and childcare tasks on childbearing intentions, we have shown that it is not sufficient to only look at the division of work and care among the partners. It is necessary to consider satisfaction with the division of household work and care, that is, to consider gender equity in family work, in order to grasp the impact which the division of family tasks between the partners has on their childbearing intentions. On the whole, we find that while sharing household and care tasks support childbearing intentions of women and of men, women seem to value the actual sharing, while men set more store on their satisfaction. There is also a difference in the effect of household work and of childcare work on women’s and men’s further childbearing intentions. This make it necessary to differentiate between these two family work components if one wants to explore the impact of gender (in)equality in the private sphere on childbearing.

Our explorations thus raise some issues regarding research and policies related to gender equality and fertility. First, although we have only assessed a limited number of gender-equality aspects, we hope that we have demonstrated the importance of conceptualizing gender equality in a way that it recognizes gender equity and allows for the distinction between gender differences and gender inequality. As mentioned, we need concepts which grasp the manifestations of inequality but acknowledge the existence of gender differences. Only such an approach will open up space for detecting which aspects of gender equality matter for fertility decisions. Second, we have also demonstrated the need to investigate childbearing decisions of women, of men, and for each parity separately, as gender issues play out differently for each of them. We need the
perspectives of women and of men, of mothers, and of fathers to assess which gender issues play which role in which decision-making process. Our study illustrates the various ruptures in gender equality brought about by parenthood (at different parities) and the need to investigate them in more detail. Third, our results show that there is no simple answer to the question of which equality matters for fertility. Compared to the general assumption in demography that the gap between gender equality in the employment sphere and gender inequality in the family sphere keeps fertility at low levels, our results reveal that the relationship between gender equality, employment, family, and fertility is much more complex. There exist various concurrent gender inequalities within employment as well as within the family. The results highlight the need to consider the plurality of inequalities and to identify their substantive elements in employment, society, and in the family. To look for inequalities in resources, in capabilities, in agency, and in the perception of fairness can provide a useful tool to locate the essential dimensions of inequality and to understand which gender (in)equalities in employment, in society, and in family work matter for childbearing decisions.

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Table 1 Childbearing Intentions across selected European countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Childless women OR</th>
<th>Childless men OR</th>
<th>One-child women OR</th>
<th>One-child men OR</th>
<th>Two-child women OR</th>
<th>Two-child men OR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3.33 0.000</td>
<td>2.92 0.000</td>
<td>0.14 0.000</td>
<td>0.36 0.000</td>
<td>0.07 0.000</td>
<td>0.12 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>5.79 0.000</td>
<td>3.82 0.000</td>
<td>0.24 0.000</td>
<td>0.47 0.001</td>
<td>0.14 0.000</td>
<td>0.32 0.000</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
<td>20.51 0.000</td>
<td>54.48 0.000</td>
<td>0.41 0.002</td>
<td>1.10 0.693</td>
<td>0.27 0.000</td>
<td>0.51 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2.42 0.001</td>
<td>1.68 0.021</td>
<td>0.10 0.000</td>
<td>0.23 0.000</td>
<td>0.05 0.000</td>
<td>0.10 0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1.66 0.043</td>
<td>1.13 0.605</td>
<td>0.16 0.000</td>
<td>0.34 0.000</td>
<td>0.14 0.000</td>
<td>0.32 0.000</td>
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<td>France (ref.)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.87 0.508</td>
<td>0.56 0.007</td>
<td>0.12 0.000</td>
<td>0.20 0.000</td>
<td>0.16 0.000</td>
<td>0.18 0.000</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.79 0.002</td>
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<td>0.49 0.003</td>
<td>0.13 0.000</td>
<td>0.19 0.000</td>
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</table>

N= 2,992 3,030 5,732 5,430 9,927 10,171

Note: Controlled for respondent's age, educational attainment, marital status, activity status; for parents also for age of the youngest child and for the number of children
Table 2 Employment Status and Childbearing Intentions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Childless women</th>
<th>Childless men</th>
<th>One-child women</th>
<th>One-child men</th>
<th>Two+child women</th>
<th>Two+child men</th>
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<td>Respondent's activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Active full time</td>
<td>1.99 0.000</td>
<td>2.07 0.000</td>
<td>0.85 0.025</td>
<td>1.25 0.031</td>
<td>0.93 0.403</td>
<td>1.00 0.988</td>
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<td>Active part-time</td>
<td>1.57 0.006</td>
<td>1.62 0.057</td>
<td>0.96 0.664</td>
<td>1.10 0.600</td>
<td>0.73 0.005</td>
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<td>Not employed (ref.)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent's activity</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active full time</td>
<td>1.89 0.000</td>
<td>1.91 0.000</td>
<td>0.85 0.021</td>
<td>1.26 0.028</td>
<td>0.92 0.365</td>
<td>1.00 0.988</td>
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<td>Active part-time</td>
<td>1.51 0.014</td>
<td>1.56 0.083</td>
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<td>0.73 0.004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partner's activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>1.60 0.001</td>
<td>1.37 0.002</td>
<td>1.31 0.007</td>
<td>0.96 0.549</td>
<td>1.21 0.089</td>
<td>1.02 0.767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not employed (ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Controlled for respondent's age, educational attainment, marital status, country of residence; for parents also for age of the youngest child and for the number of children. All countries included.
Table 3: Work- and contract conditions and childbearing intentions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work Conditions</th>
<th>Childless women</th>
<th>Childless men</th>
<th>One-child women</th>
<th>One-child men</th>
<th>Two+child women</th>
<th>Two+child men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of contract</strong></td>
<td><strong>OR</strong></td>
<td><strong>p.v.</strong></td>
<td><strong>OR</strong></td>
<td><strong>p.v.</strong></td>
<td><strong>OR</strong></td>
<td><strong>p.v.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not employed (ref.)</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.519</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Work-flexibility</strong></th>
<th><strong>OR</strong></th>
<th><strong>p.v.</strong></th>
<th><strong>OR</strong></th>
<th><strong>p.v.</strong></th>
<th><strong>OR</strong></th>
<th><strong>p.v.</strong></th>
<th><strong>OR</strong></th>
<th><strong>p.v.</strong></th>
<th><strong>OR</strong></th>
<th><strong>p.v.</strong></th>
<th><strong>OR</strong></th>
<th><strong>p.v.</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empl., flex. time</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.557</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empl., not flex. time</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.245</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not employed (ref.)</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.460</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Controlled for respondent's age, educational attainment, marital status, part-time vs full-time employment status, partner's activity status, country of residence; for parents also age of the youngest child and number of children. Hungary and the Netherlands are not included due to missing information about type of contract and work-flexibility.
Table 4: Economic situation and childbearing intentions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Easy to make ends meet No (ref.=Yes)</td>
<td>0.93 0.570</td>
<td>0.80 0.042</td>
<td>0.89 0.121</td>
<td>0.81 0.005</td>
<td>1.03 0.716</td>
<td>0.99 0.871</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Controlled for respondent's age, educational attainment, marital status, employment status, partner's activity status, country of residence; for parents also age of the youngest child and number of children. The Netherlands are not included due to missing information about making ends meet.
Table 5: Division of household work, satisfaction with the division of household work and childbearing intentions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housework issues</th>
<th>Childless women</th>
<th>Childless men</th>
<th>One-child women</th>
<th>One-child men</th>
<th>Two+child women</th>
<th>Two+child men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>1.29 0.084</td>
<td>0.94 0.807</td>
<td>1.18 0.037</td>
<td>1.00 0.983</td>
<td>1.26 0.015</td>
<td>1.07 0.549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbalanced (ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of housework division</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>1.16 0.464</td>
<td>1.41 0.184</td>
<td>1.24 0.028</td>
<td>1.08 0.522</td>
<td>1.18 0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsatisfied (ref.)</td>
<td>1.04 0.740</td>
<td>1.02 0.876</td>
<td>1.20 0.011</td>
<td>1.27 0.023</td>
<td>1.05 0.550</td>
<td>1.35 0.006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Controlled for respondent's age, educational attainment, marital status, employment status, partner's activity status, country; for parents also age of the youngest child and number of children. The Netherlands are not included due to missing information about satisfaction with the housework division.
Table 6: Division of childcare work, satisfaction with the gender division of childcare and childbearing intentions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Childcare Issues</th>
<th>One-child women</th>
<th>One-child men</th>
<th>Two-child women</th>
<th>Two-child men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OR p.v.</td>
<td>OR p.v.</td>
<td>OR p.v.</td>
<td>OR p.v.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Index of childcare division</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>1,23 0,030</td>
<td>1,27 0,042</td>
<td>1,32 0,008</td>
<td>1,01 0,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbalanced (ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Index of childcare division</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>1,15 0,182</td>
<td>1,38 0,021</td>
<td>1,26 0,046</td>
<td>0,96 0,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unbalanced (ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Satisfaction on childcare</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>1,23 0,025</td>
<td>1,31 0,032</td>
<td>1,07 0,504</td>
<td>1,11 0,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsatisfied (ref.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Controlled for respondent's age, educational attainment, marital status, employment status, partner's activity status, country; for parents also age of the youngest child and number of children. Italy and the Netherlands are not included due to missing information about childcare division and satisfaction on childcare division.